Agreeing to Disagree - Pre-game Interaction and the Issue of Community
نویسنده
چکیده
Playing online multiplayer games entails matching oneself with other players. To do so, players must typically employ various types of communication tools that are part of the game or of game-external matching services. But despite the centrality of these tools they receive little attention in discussions of game design and game HCI. This paper seeks to rectify this situation by presenting an in-depth analysis of two pre-game interaction systems which represent influential approaches. Whereas one of these games allows for high player control and thus inspires negotiation, the other allows player communication mainly to help players pass time between matches. The two approaches are discussed in the light of HCI researcher Jenny Preece’s concept of “sociability” and zoologist Amotz Zahavi’s demonstration of criteria for “honest signalling”. The paper concludes with a discussion of the trade-off facing game designers between efficiency and community-supporting social interaction.
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