Dynamic Costly Disclosure very preliminary and incomplete

Not Only What But also When A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE

Dynamic Disclosure with Uncertain Disclosure Costs∗

This paper extends the canonical single-period model of voluntary costly disclosure to a dynamic setting with asymmetric information over disclosure costs. I show that dynamic incentives have an ambiguous effect on firms’ disclosure decision and that the cost of disclosure no longer prevents full disclosure by all firms. My main results show that (1) there is a positive inter-temporal connectio...

Truthful Communication of Information (preliminary and incomplete)

This paper offers a unified treatment of truthful communication in the context of the sale of an asset under incomplete information. Among other things, the framework accommodates general assumptions about reporting costs, information endowments, the language of communication or the productive uses of information. I show that this class of problems admits a unique perfect sequential rational ex...

Analysis of Dynamic Longitudinal Categorical Data in Incomplete Contingency Tables Using Capture-Recapture Sampling: A case Study of Semi-Concentrated Doctoral Exam

Abstract. In this paper, dynamic longitudinal categorical data and estimation of their parameters in incomplete contingency tables are evaluated. To apply the proposed method, a study has been conducted on the data of the semi-concentrated doctoral exam of the National Organization for Educational Testing (NOET). The results of studies such as the obtained confidence intervals and calculating t...

Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure

This paper studies the joint design of optimal incentive pay and information disclosure in a dynamic moral hazard problem. The principal is more informed about the outcomes of agent’s actions and actively manages information available to the agent. Sharing information with the agent increases productivity (for example, allowing a better allocation of resources or effort), but increases the cost...