Resolving the Ellsberg Paradox by Assuming that People Evaluate Repetitive Sampling
نویسنده
چکیده
Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational choice. He asked people to bet on the outcome of certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities. They usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities. It is shown that this behavior is reasonable and in accordance with the axioms of rational decision making if it is assumed that people consider bets on events that are repeatedly sampled instead of just sampled once.
منابع مشابه
CARESS Working Paper 99 - 03 A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion 1 Yoram Halevy
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تاریخ انتشار 2007