Fee versus royalty reconsidered
نویسنده
چکیده
For an outsider innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing could be superior to both fixed fee and auction. The result depends on a simple fact that has been overlooked in the existing literature, namely, the number of licenses can take only integer values. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D21; D43; D45
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 53 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005