Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics
نویسنده
چکیده
In a recent dynamical systems model of platform adaptation in spatial voting models, Miller and Stadler (J. Econ. Dyn. & Control 1998, in press) showed that, assuming concave voter utility functions and complete participation, there is a globally stable equilibrium located at the mean voter position. Here we show that abstention depending on the distances between voters and platforms may lead to bifurcations rendering the mean voter equilibrium unstable. We nd up to seven equilibria, up to four of which are local attractors for the platform dynamics.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Applied Mathematics and Computation
دوره 114 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000