Maneuver Warfare Science 2001

require the use of color in order to fully convey their points. Foreword Six years ago, the Marine Corps embarked on new efforts based on the " New Sciences " to provide quantitative answers, where possible, to the important questions facing military decision-makers. Maneuver Warfare Science 1998 described some initial thoughts on providing support to these decision-makers in areas that our traditional techniques by themselves have not. Since 1998, additional efforts have begun and this book is an attempt to offer more ideas and elicit feedback on these explorations. As part of the exploration process, at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command we have developed a concept called Operational Synthesis that is being implemented through what we call Project Albert. In particular, we utilize the meta-technique of Data Farming that has been made possible by advances in computing power and data visualization methods. Part I of this book begins with an overview of Operational Synthesis by Dr. Gary Horne, the executive director of Project Albert and the inventor of Data Farming. Capt John Kresho, leader of our computing related efforts at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, follows with an article describing our efforts to harness computing power that can be summarized by one of his favorite sayings: " Go big or go home. " And Ted Meyer and Sarah Johnson conclude Part I by describing advances in data visualization that are key to dealing with the huge amounts of data that we feel we must try to understand to make progress on answering our questions. In order to help answer these questions we must be able to quantify three phenomena; nonlinearity, the so-called intangibles and coevolving landscapes. By nonlinear we mean that small changes can have large impacts on outcomes. To the extent that nonlinearities play a significant role in warfare outcomes is the same extent that they have been ignored by Operations Analysis (OA). Similarly, OA tends to give short shrift to probably a more important factor in war, namely the intangibles, e.g., morale, training, leadership, etc. Desert Storm is clearly an example where these factors dominated the battlefield. Equally important is the need to determine the impact of coevolving landscapes, the phenomenon where one's decisions are made in anticipation of the opponent's, who in turn anticipates. It is unlikely that any important military decision was made without coevolving considerations. Depending on the question, each of the above …