Binary Participation in Public Goods Allocations
نویسندگان
چکیده
An environment is studied in which mechanisms suggest public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations such that unanimous participation is an equilibrium is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and shrinks to the endowment as the economy is replicated. Optimal public goods mechanisms therefore suffer from non-participation in their outcomes when agents cannot be coerced to contribute. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, C72, H41.
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Equilibrium Participation in Public Goods Allocations
We consider a notion of voluntary participation for mechanism design in public goods economies in which mechanisms select public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations that are robust to non-participation is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and may shrink to the endow...
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