Innovation, Licensing, and Price vs
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) can be completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.
منابع مشابه
Optimal licensing innovation * of cost - reducing
We analyze licensing of a cost reducing innovation to an oligopolistic industry, and extend previous work by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) in two directions. First, our analysis applies to a wider class of demand functions than linear ones. Second, we derive a simple optimal licensing mechanism for the patentee. We also examine three licensing mechanisms commonly discusse...
متن کاملA Dynamic Model of the Impact of Pre-Discovery Licensing on Innovation and Product Market Efficiency: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry∗
This study evaluates the impact of pre-discovery licensing on innovation and product market efficiency. Pre-discovery licensing is a form of R&D cooperation between firms, which accounts for more than 95% of all research collaborations. Pre-discovery licensing is pursued independently between firms, i.e., without governmental support. In contrast, in a research joint venture firms cooperate in ...
متن کاملGeneral licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation: (a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear royalty, and (b) combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown that in an oligopoly, the total reduction in the cost due to the innovation for the pre-innovation competitive output forms the lower bound of the payoffs o...
متن کاملBargaining and Delay in Patent Licensing
We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete tech...
متن کاملنقش حقوق رقابت در بهبود سلامت عمومی
Competition as an important incentive for innovation leads to freedom of choice and price reduction and contributes to more rapid provision of new and effective therapeutic technologies. On the other hand, anti-competitive practices adopted by economic undertakings in the health sector may disrupt competition including limited access to medicines and medical services or increase in their price....
متن کامل