Rationalizable Expectations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Aspects of Rationalizable Behaviour
Equilibria in games involve common “rational” expectations, which are supposed to be endogenous. Apart from being more plausible, and requiring less common knowledge, rationalizable strategies may be better able than equilibria to capture the essential intuition behind both correlated strategies and forward induction. A version of Pearce’s “cautious” rationalizability allowing correlation betwe...
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We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this ...
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We consider an economic model that features : 1. a continuum of agents 2. an aggregate state of the world over which agents have an infinitesimal influence. We first review the connections between the “eductive viewpoint” that puts emphasis for example on “Strongly Rational Expectations equilibrium” and the standard game-theoretical rationalizability concepts. Besides the Cobweb tâtonnement out...
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For a finite set of actions and a rich set of fundamentals, consider the interim rationalizable actions on the universal type space, endowed with the usual product topology. (1) Generically, there exists a unique rationalizable action profile. (2) Every model can be approximately embedded in a dominance-solvable model. (3) For any given rationalizable strategy of any finite model, there exists ...
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An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is ...
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