Incentive Dynamics in Interdependent Network Security Or: Buying a Raft and Out-Running a Bear

نویسنده

  • John Chuang
چکیده

German sociologist Ulrich Beck declared two decades ago, in 1992, that we are living in a "risk society" [2]. Not only do we face risks from natural hazards that are beyond human control, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, we also make conscious decisions to create, negotiate, and accept risks from man-made hazards, including radiation from nuclear power plants, chest x-rays, flying in an airplane controlled by computers, driving a car, and even shopping online. We even have a quantification of risk as expected loss, risk = pL, i.e., the product of the probability of event and the magnitude of loss per event. For many public safety and occupational safety scenarios, the losses are often measured in lives lost. Yet, the risk mitigation alternatives incur costs measured in dollars. Therefore, our governments compute, in real dollar figures, the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) [3], and use it to regulate acceptable levels of radiation exposure, to mandate installation of front passenger airbags, etc.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012