Framing Joint Action 5

8 9 Abstract Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at 10 capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading 11 accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I 12 argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is 13 strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication 14 on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that 15 I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael 16 Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is 17 a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and 18 group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can 19 yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less 20 cognitively demanding.