Can Priming Cooperation Increase Public Good Contributions?

نویسندگان

  • Michalis Drouvelis
  • Robert Metcalfe
چکیده

We investigate the effect of priming on pro-social behaviour in a setting where there is a clear financial incentive to free ride. By activating the concept of cooperation among randomly selected individuals, we explore whether it is possible to positively influence people's voluntary contributions to the public good. Our findings indicate that cooperative priming increases contributions in a one-shot public goods game from approximately 25% to 36% compared with the non-primed group. The results call for further explorations of the role of priming in economic behaviours in general.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015