A Theory of Political Polarization*

We present a simple theory of voters’ preferences over representatives, assuming that a representative will vote on one’s behalf. Few, if any elected representatives are capable of unilaterally implementing their platforms: rather, they choose between options generated by other actors and/or external events. When this is the case, voters’ preferences over candidates’ platforms will almost always be asymmetric even if voters’ preferences over policy outcomes are symmetric. Furthermore, these induced preferences tend to prefer more extreme (“polarizing”) representatives when the legislative agenda is independent of the status quo. *Sections 3 & 4 are currently incomplete. Of course, comments on all parts are very welcome. Prepared for presentation at the Colloquium on Law Economics and Politics at New York University School of Law, September 5, 2017. We thank Alberto Alesina, Chris Berry, Thomas Bräuninger, John Brehm, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Peter Buisseret, Bill Clark, Tom Clark, Torun Dewan, Wioletta Dziuda, Scott DeMarchi, Mark Fey, Sean Gailmard, Bernard Grofman, Gabe Lenz, Thomas Leeper, Tom Mann, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Amy Pond, Jas Sekhon, Ken Shepsle, Ahmer Tarar, Stephane Wolton, Dan Wood, and audience members at the University of Chicago, University of California-Berkeley, University of California-Irvine, University of California-Merced, Harvard University, London School of Economics, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Stanford University, Texas A&M University, University of Warwick, and the 2016 annual meetings of the Southern and Midwest Political Science Associations for very helpful comments on, and conversations, about this project, which was previously circulated under the title “Does Representation Induce Polarization? A Theory of Choosing Representatives.” All errors are our own. †Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Email: [email protected]. ‡Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Email: [email protected].