Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement Viewpoint
نویسنده
چکیده
At the height of the Cold War, most analysis of security cooperation focused on bilateral USSoviet arms control. Today, more of the focus has shifted to multilateral agreements; this makes it important to determine the circumstances under which compliance with these agreements can be assured. This viewpoint sketches out some ideas about the factors that foster and impede compliance, and uses these ideas to identify some areas where policy change is needed to improve the chances for success in multilateral arms control.
منابع مشابه
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime
I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof+ Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilat...
متن کاملInspection Games in Arms Control
An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that th...
متن کاملInspection games in arms control by RUDOLPH AVENHAUS, MORTON CANTY, D. MARC KILGOUR, BERNHARD VON STENGEL and SHMUEL ZAMIR
An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that th...
متن کاملInternational Control of Nuclear Proliferation: beyond Carrots and Sticks
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 40 Ronald B. Mitchell is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Oregon. His book Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, published in 1994 by The MIT Press, received the 1995 International Studies Association Sprout Award for best book on international environmental politics. He has...
متن کاملCEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa
This Article examines treaty body compliance discourse through an examination of the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudence related to sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the constructivist literature and the sociological framing literature, Part I of this article introduces adoption and adaptation as key features for domestically enforcing treaty obligations. Part I also introduces the CEDAW Committee com...
متن کامل