The unity of higher cognition: the case against dual process theory

Dual process theorists posit the existence of two distinct types (type-1/type-2) of cognitive processing in order to explain domains of higher cognition such as reasoning and decision-making. Such theories typically allude to co-varying clusters of properties (i.e. a dualcluster thesis) as well as an underlying mechanism or system for each processing type (i.e. a dual systems thesis). I will argue that a host of empirical findings cast doubt upon the validity of both theses, and that simpler models of higher cognition—that do not appeal to types of processing— might be preferable. INDEX WORDS: Dual process theory, The Unimodel, Evolution of cognition, Reasoning and decision-making, Cognitive science, Philosophy of psychology THE UNITY OF HIGHER COGNITION: THE CASE AGAINST DUAL PROCESS THEORY