A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
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چکیده
This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in games with communication, focusing on environments where ``talk is cheap'' in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92. 1998 Academic Press
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 1998