Power in Weighted Majority Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power determines the ability of a voter to influence the outcomes of the voting bodies he belongs to. In a weighted majority game each voter is assigned a certain nonnegative real number weight and there is a positive real number quota satisfying a boundedness condition such that a group of voters can pass a resolution if the sum of the weights of the group members is at least as high as the given quota. The new index is shown to satisfy all the reasonable postulates for an index of voting power. A comparison of the new index with some of the existing indices is also presented. Finally, the paper develops an axiomatic characterization of the new index. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, D72.
منابع مشابه
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
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