WORKING PAPER The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach
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منابع مشابه
Campaign Spending in the Local Government Elections of 1999
For the first time in Irish electoral history, the 1999 local elections required candidates to publicly declare their campaign expenditures. Drawing on these data, we explore patterns in campaign spending and assess their impact, both on candidate success and on turnout. First, examining the elections contested by 1,838 candidates from 180 local constituencies and 34 councils, we identify both ...
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