Recursive methods for incentive problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
Many separable dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recursive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual approaches, relate value iteration under each and give conditions for such value iteration to be convergent to the true value function. JEL codes: C61, C73, D82, D86, E61.
منابع مشابه
Contractive Dual Methods for Incentive Problems
Several recent papers have proposed recursive Lagrangian-basedmethods for solving dynamic contracting problems. Thesemethods give rise to Bellman operators that incorporate either a dual inf-sup or a saddle point operation. We give conditions that ensure the Bellman operator implied by a dual recursive formulation is contractive. JEL codes: C61, C73, D82, E61.
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