The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
نویسنده
چکیده
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4 × 4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C73
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 59 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007