Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia

ended in the early 1990s, many leading scholars offered a bleak prognosis for East Asia: with the decline of the Soviet Union and the rise of China, the region would move toward an unstable multipolar order, as the United States drew down its forces, Japan remilitarized, China’s economic and military power grew, and other countries in the region began to engage in arms races.1 More than a decade and a half later, however, East Asia has not descended into intense security competition with a high risk of violent conoict as predicted; instead an interim order that incorporates the United States, China, and other major regional players continues to prevail. Why has East Asia enjoyed relative stability and peace in the post–Cold War era? The answer can be found partly in great power dynamics. The region has remained stable since 1990 largely because the United States has maintained its web of alliances and its deep economic and strategic involvement in the region; and it has avoided major conoicts partly because China has chosen not to aggressively challenge the status quo. These great power policy decisions, however, have also been inouenced by the actions and persuasion of other regional states. In particular, the relatively peaceful transition so far may be the result of two complementary strategies on the part of key East Asian states such as Japan and leading countries of Southeast Asia: (1) the building of regional multilateral institutions that serve to regulate exchanges, develop norms, and create regional identity, thereby institutionalizing cooperation among the major powers and socializing China; and (2) indirect balancing