The Randomized Condorcet Voting System
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, we study the strategy-proofness properties of the randomized Condorcet voting system (RCVS). Discovered at several occasions independently, the RCVS is arguably the natural extension of the Condorcet method to cases where a deterministic Condorcet winner does not exists. Indeed, it selects the always-existing and essentially unique Condorcet winner of lotteries over alternatives. Our main result is that, in a certain class of voting systems based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives, the RCVS is the only one to be Condorcet-proof. By Condorcet-proof, we mean that, when a Condorcet winner exists, it must be selected and no voter has incentives to misreport his preferences. We also prove two theorems about group-strategy-proofness. On one hand, we prove that there is no group-strategyproof voting system that always selects existing Condorcet winners. On the other hand, we prove that, when preferences have a one-dimensional structure, the RCVS is group-strategy-proof.
منابع مشابه
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