Pollutant Abatement Investment under Ambiguity in a Two-Period Model∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper investigates a pollutant abatement investment under ambiguity in a twoperiod setting. We consider there are representative consumer and firm in an economy and formulate the social welfare maximization problem. Then we numerically derive the optimal level of abatement investment. Furthermore, we analyze the comparative static effects of the model’s parameters and find an increase in the degree of ambiguity encourages pollutant abatement investment.
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