Frege and Object Dependent Propositions

The traditional interpretation of Frege has him endorsing propositions that are not object dependent, i.e., propositions that can exist even though the proper names that occur in the sentences that express them do not refer. But John McDowell and Gareth Evans have challenged this with an influential interpretation of Frege. McDowell first introduced a Fregean reading that included object dependent propositions and contrasted them to Frege’s senses which he took to be object-independent (McDowell, 1977, pp. 172-174). But shortly thereafter, in The Varieties of Reference, Evans proposed an interpretation of Frege according to which Frege's senses are object dependent (Evans, 1981 and 1982, ch. 1). McDowell later endorsed Evans’ interpretation of Frege (McDowell, 1984 and 1986). The introduction of object dependent propositions among Fregeans seems, at least initially, to blur the distinction between them and Russellians, for one way to characterize the two camps is to allege that Russellians accept object dependent propositions while Fregeans don’t accept such propositions and that Russellians, unlike Fregeans, are advocates of wide content. Although Evans does not make the object referred to a part of the proposition expressed, the introduction of object dependent thoughts in a Fregean framework made it possible for neoFregeans to do so, much as Russellians do with singular propositions. While there are some similarities between the theories of Russellians and neo-Fregeans, the salient difference between the two concerns the mode of presentation of the referent. The Russellians argue that the proposition expressed is a singular proposition that does not contain a mode of presentation, and