The Impact of Majority-Minority Districts on Congressional Elections

We utilize the Cox and Katz (1998, 2002) bargaining model of the redistricting process and data from the 1972-2000 House elections to answer two questions: first, does the creation of majority-minority districts increase the likelihood that minority candidates will be elected in those districts? Second, does the creation of majority-minority districts also generate pro-Republican gerrymanders? We demonstrate that after controlling for the proportion of minorities in a state, as the proportion of majorityminority districts increases, the proportion of minorities elected to the House increases as well, regardless of which party controls the redistricting process. This result is consistent with previous research. To test the hypothesis that majority-minority districting has “perverse-effects,” the seats-votes curves are estimated for each election, allowing for the partisan or bipartisan control of the redistricting process and the presence of majority-minority mandates. We demonstrate that there is no significant difference in the level of partisan bias observed under redistricting plans with majority-minority districts and those without majority-minority districts. The claim that majority-minority districting has “perverse-effects” is not supported by the data. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005, Chicago, Illinois. The authors can be contacted at Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences; California Institute of Technology; Pasadena, CA 91125 USA; [email protected] and Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences; California Institute of Technology; Pasadena, CA 91125 USA; [email protected], respectively.