A Epistemic Luck

There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent literature regarding the supposed phenomenon of “epistemic luck.” This is the putative situation in which an agent gains knowledge even though that knowledge has come about in a way that has, in some sense to be specified, involved luck in some significant measure. Unfortunately, very little of the literature that deals with epistemic luck has offered an account of it that is anything more than suggestive. The aim of this paper is to offer a more nuanced elucidation of what is involved in different types of epistemic luck. More specifically, an account of luck is proposed and several varieties of epistemic luck are shown to be compatible with knowledge possession, in contrast to two other varieties whose status is much more problematic. It is argued that by being clear about what is involved in epistemic luck one can gain an insight into several central debates in epistemology, including the “Gettier” counterexamples, the problem of radical scepticism and the so-called “metaepistemological” challenge to externalist theories of knowledge. common intuition that is often expressed regarding knowledge is that it is true belief that has been formed in a non-lucky or non-accidental fashion.1 Indeed, this is often thought to be the proper moral to be drawn from the Gettier (1963) counterexamples to the classical tripartite account of knowledge—that the classical account left knowledge possession unduly exposed to the vagaries of luck.2 It is not difficult to see the attraction of such a view, since knowledge is clearly a cognitive achievement of some sort and cognitive achievements are not naturally thought of as being due (either in whole or part) to serendipity. 194 DUNCAN PRITCHARD Nevertheless, this cannot be the full story because it does seem that all knowledge must be, to some degree, dependent upon luck. After all, knowledge involves a kind of union of agent and world, and thus is ineliminably dependent upon the co-operation of that world. As Wittgenstein (1969, section 505) famously put it, “It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.” This essential dependence upon the co-operation of the world has led some commentators to urge that we must accept the existence of epistemic luck. For sure, they argue, knowledge cannot be wholly due to luck (such as when one gains a true belief via a lucky guess for example3), but we must be wary of concluding from this that luck must play no part in the proper possession of knowledge. Accordingly, one finds such distinguished writers as Linda Zagzebski (1999, 109) arguing that “epistemic luck permeates the human condition, whether for good or ill.” One should be cautious about being so sanguine in the face of epistemic luck, however, for two reasons. The first is that, as so often in epistemological disputes, the radical sceptic is lurking in the background waiting for a chance to strike. Since the intuition that knowledge precludes luck is so strong, it is open to the radical sceptic to use this concession as a way of motivating her intellectually devastating conclusion. We will return to explore the radical sceptical challenge at the end of this paper. The second reason why we should be wary, is that many of the writers who allow epistemic luck often fail to give any detailed account of just what it is that they are conceding and how, in particular, it differs from that variety of epistemic luck that should not be conceded (as in the supposedly “pure” case of a lucky guess). A more detailed examination of epistemic luck is thus in order. Section I briefly outlines a rough modal theory of luck. Section II looks at Peter Unger’s (1968) account of this notion and uses it to highlight several varieties of epistemic luck that are compatible with knowledge possession. In contrast, Sections III–IV consider two types of luck that do seem to pose a genuine problem for knowledge possession, and draws some general epistemological morals as a result. In particular, the following issues are discussed in the light of this treatment of epistemic luck: the “Gettier” counterexamples (including the “barn façade” and “assassination” cases); the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; the problem of radical scepticism; and the socalled “metaepistemological” challenge to externalist theories of knowledge. Finally, Section V offers some concluding remarks.