Third Order Differential Analysis and A Split Mask Countermeasure For Low Energy Embedded Processors

Future wireless embedded devices will be increasingly powerful supporting many more applications including one of the most crucial, security. Although many embedded devices offer more resistance to bus probing attacks due to their compact size, susceptibility to power or electromagnetic analysis attacks must be analyzed. This paper presents a new split mask countermeasure to thwart low order differential power analysis (DPA) and differential EM analysis (DEMA). For the first time real power and EM measurements are used to analyze the difficulty of launching new 3 order DPA and DEMA attacks on a popular low energy 32-bit embedded ARM processor. Results show that the new split mask countermeasure provides increased security without large overheads of energy dissipation compared to previous research. With the emergence of security applications in PDAs, cellphones, and other embedded devices, low energy countermeasures for resistance to low order DPA/DEMA is crucial for supporting future wireless internet enabled devices.