Brokers, clients and elite political networks in Mexico

Political sociologists have distinguished between Weberian states in which elite promotions are based on meritocratic criteria and states in which personalistic networks dominate government careers, linking these different career types to state structures and capacity. While researchers also recognize that elite networks are important even in highly bureaucratized states, there is little systematic research on the structure or consequences of these networks. This paper analyzes the determinants of promotion to the cabinet in Mexico, demonstrating that brokerage positions in elite networks are associated with a higher likelihood of political promotion and arguing that brokerage appointments are a strategy for maintaining elite cohesion. The results also show that this brokerage advantage coexists with a patronage appointment strategy. The empirical analysis relies on elite networks inferred from a unique new dataset that includes systematic educational and career histories of senior political elites over a period of more than seventy years. Brokerage advantage is stronger during periods marked by less internal fragmentation and contestation, implying an extension of previous theories of brokerage advantage in political networks. The results also show that patronage appointment strategies are not unique to weak, patrimonial states.