Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies1
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain. 1 The authors thank Professors Miyake, M., and Thomson, W. and two anonymous referee for their helpful and detailed suggestions. They also thank Asano, T. and Suzuki, M. for their useful comments.
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We...
متن کاملMaximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good
In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include ``a minimally rich domain.'' We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof...
متن کاملA maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.
متن کاملMaximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic Choice Rules
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and either strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic social choice rules. Next, to comprehend the limitations the two Theorems imply fo...
متن کامل