R&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, arrow and inverted-U's

Patent Licensing, Entry and the Incentive to Innovate

We analyze the economic impact of process innovations where the innovator auctions o licenses to both potential entrants and incumbent rms. It is shown that opening the market to entrant licensees, the incentive to innovate is maximized in a monopoly market as was envisioned by Schumpeter (1942). This is in contrast to previous literature on licensing of process innovations where entry is exclu...

Automatic Discovery of Technology Networks for Industrial-Scale R&D IT Projects via Data Mining

Industrial-Scale R&D IT Projects depend on many sub-technologies which need to be understood and have their risks analysed before the project can begin for their success. When planning such an industrial-scale project, the list of technologies and the associations of these technologies with each other is often complex and form a network. Discovery of this network of technologies is time consumi...

Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints and Thresholds

    Abstract   Extended Oligopoly models will be introduced and examined in which the firms might face capacity limits, thresholds for minimal and maximal moves, and antitrust thresholds in the case of partial cooperation. Similar situation occurs when there is an additional cost of output adjustment, which is discontinuous at zero due to set-up costs. In these cases the payoff functions of the...

Profit Taxation and Capital Accumulation in Dynamic Oligopoly Models

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics à la Solow-Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. In both settings, we evaluate the effects of (gross) profit taxation, proving that there exist tax rates yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dyna...

Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation