Closing the Npt Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion Reactors

James Clay Moltz is Research Professor and Assistant Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He also directs the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Project at CNS. From 1993-98 (Vols. 1-5), Dr. Moltz was Editor of this journal. When the authors of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) crafted their landmark document in the mid-1960s, the “bargain” they reached with the non-nuclear weapon states required them to leave a number of nuclear activities in the category of “acceptable” uses. This grouping covered a broad range because the nonnuclear weapon states wanted to maintain the widest possible options in return for giving up their right to nuclear weapons. Beyond nuclear research and power reactors, these allowed uses included so-called “peaceful nuclear explosions” (or PNEs) for industrial purposes and the operation of naval propulsion reactors (NPRs) for commercial shipping.