Samuel Bowles , Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors ?
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Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors?
Since Darwin, intergroup hostilities have figured prominently in explanations of the evolution of human social behavior. Yet whether ancestral humans were largely "peaceful" or "warlike" remains controversial. I ask a more precise question: If more cooperative groups were more likely to prevail in conflicts with other groups, was the level of intergroup violence sufficient to influence the evol...
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