Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957) of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.
منابع مشابه
Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited Attraction
In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent for service. Two utility functions for agents are considered: support utility and winner utility. We generalize the results by Feldman et al. to the case where the clients are distribut...
متن کاملProbabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition
The pioneering model of electoral competition was developed by Harold Hotelling and Anthony Downs. The model developed by Hotelling and Downs and many subsequent models in the literature about electoral competition have assumed that candidates embody policies and, if a voter is not indifferent between the policies embodied by two candidates, then the voter’s choices are fully determined by his ...
متن کاملHotelling Model 3 Candidates
Sections 3 and 4 present the two versions of the model, which make different The model has a continuum of voters with unit mass and two candidates, 1 and 2. ABSTRACT We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n 3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Congyi Xiang discover inside connections to recommended job candidates, industry January 2...
متن کاملBandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case
The present paper studies the Hotelling-Downs and the Wittman-Roemer models of two-party competition when voter conformism is present and the policy space is uni-dimensional. We consider two types of voter conformism, bandwagon and underdog, and study their effects on political equilibrium of the two models. Even if voter conformism is present, the Hotelling-Downs parties propose an identical p...
متن کاملHotelling-downs Model of Electoral Competition and the Option to Quit
We study a variant of the multi-candidate Hotelling-Downs model that recognizes that politicians, even after declaring candidacy, have the option of withdrawing before the election date. We find that this natural variation dramatically alters equilibrium predictions. Under a mild parametric restriction, an equilibrium always exists for an arbitrary finite number of candidates. Moreover, under s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016