Ernst Fehr ; Klaus

نویسندگان

  • Ernst Fehr
  • Klaus M. Schmidt
چکیده

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. JEL classification numbers: C7, C9, D0, J3.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – A Reply

In a recent “pamphlet” Shaked (2005) harshly criticizes two of our papers, Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003). This reply shows that Shaked's charges are not substantiated in any way. It points out several logical flaws in his arguments and shows that he grossly misquotes and misinterprets our papers. * This note is a reply to A. Shaked, “The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion”, dated March 1, 2005. a) E...

متن کامل

Ernst Fehr und Klaus M . Schmidt : Fairness and Incentives in a Multi - Task Principal - Agent

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

متن کامل

Ernst Fehr ; Klaus M . Schmidt : Fairness and Incentives in a Multi - Task Principal - Agent

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

متن کامل

On Inequity Aversion A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.

متن کامل

Inequity Aversion, Financial Markets and Output Fluctuations

Drawing on recent advances in the study of reference dependent utility we model financial markets as a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Asset valuations may change endogenously through re-coordination which induces fluctuations in output. These fluctuations are shown to be quantitatively relevant and inefficient. JEL-Classification: G12 Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Roger Farmer...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016