Stable Schedule Matchings
نویسندگان
چکیده
In order to treat a natural schedule matching problem related with worker-firm matchings, we generalize some theorems of Baiou–Balinski and Alkan–Gale by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner.
منابع مشابه
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., forthcoming) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth (Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extensio...
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تاریخ انتشار 2011