The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games

We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the -value introduced by Berganti~ nos, CasasM endez, and V azquez-Brage (2000). The main di erence being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We show that it is well de ned on the class of totally essential and non-level games. We propose an extensive-form game whose subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payo s coincide with the Chi-compromise value.