A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing
نویسندگان
چکیده
Textbooks present the three ‘degrees’ of price discrimination as a sequence of independent pricing methods. These textbook treatments consequently provide inadequate insight as to when a firm might adopt a particular pricing strategy. The paper describes an informationbased taxonomy of price discrimination, which can be used to teach monopolistic price discrimination in an integrated way. The pricing strategy adopted by firms is based on the information on consumer demand available to it. The paper proposes a method for ranking profit and efficiency levels under different price discrimination strategies. The informationbased taxonomy is compared to the traditional textbook approach. * We would like to thank David Prentice for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain our responsibility. A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing
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