Approximately Optimal Mechanisms With Correlated Buyer Valuations
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Approximately Optimal Mechanisms With Correlated Buyer Valuations
منابع مشابه
Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations of buyers. The paper establishes conditions under which the seller can, i...
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تاریخ انتشار 2013