The Learning of an Opponent's Approximate Preferences in Bilateral Automated Negotiation

نویسندگان

  • Hamid Jazayeriy
  • Masrah Azrifah Azmi Murad
  • Md Nasir Sulaiman
  • Nur Izura Udzir
چکیده

Hamid Jazayeriy Masrah Azmi-Murad Nasir Sulaiman Nur Izura Udizir The Learning of an Opponent's Approximate Preferences in Bilateral Automated Negotiation Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research ISSN 0718–1876 Electronic Version VOL 6 / ISSUE 3 / DECEMBER 2011 / 65-84 © 2011 Universidad de Talca Chile This paper is available online at www.jtaer.com DOI: 10.4067/S0718-18762011000300006

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • JTAER

دوره 6  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011