The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses
نویسندگان
چکیده
The combinatorial clock-proxy auction is analyzed as a selling mechanism of a portion of the “digital dividend” in an European country.We assumed bidders with bounded rationality making their bidding decisions based on a system of recommendation that learns from the environment. The auction outcome when all bidders follow the proposed strategies was compared with the efficient outcome of the auction. Although significant differences were found in the seller’s income, no significant variations were found in the distribution of spectrum licenses among bidders.
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