Costly network formation and regular equilibria

نویسندگان

  • Francesco De Sinopoli
  • Carlos Pimienta
چکیده

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 69  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010