Differences in Contracting: Anchoring Formal and Relational Norms within BPO Governance
نویسندگان
چکیده
Within IS outsourcing research there is an ongoing discussion whether formal contracts and relational norms function as substitutes or as complements to each other. However, even those deals which are based on relational norms usually comprise a contract as their foundation. We therefore aim at analyzing differences in contracting between both governance modes (i.e. contract-based or based on relational norms) and exploring their impact on outsourcing satisfaction. Based on a survey with 335 Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) deals in the German banking industry we show that clauses on problem resolution are most important in BPO contract design. Furthermore, we find that deals focusing on formal governance put a lot of emphasis on the design of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) whereas deals focusing on relational governance pay special attention to the unambiguousness of outsourcing objectives.
منابع مشابه
Relational Governance Mediates the Effect of Formal Contracts on BPO Performance
Research on outsourcing governance has focused on two modes: formal governance based on a legally binding contract, and relational governance based on a psychological contract between the vendor’s relationship manager and the client’s project manager. Some researchers argue that the two forms of governance are substitutes for each other. Others model them as complements. Here, we find empirical...
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