Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles

One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar selfawareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a different state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the NeoBrentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory. INTRODUCTION: TWO RIVAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS Perhaps the earliest truly modern theory of consciousness is Franz Brentano’s. According to Brentano, a mental state M is conscious when, and only when, it is partly about itself. If x has a conscious experience of a purple ball, x’s experience not only represents that a purple ball is present, but also that it, itself, is an experience of a purple ball. Brentano’s thesis is that all and only conscious states are self-representational in this way. The capacity for self-representation Brentano attributes to conscious states strikes many current-day philosophers and cognitive scientists as a tad mysterious. A more recent approach along similar lines is the Higher-Order Monitoring theory. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring (HOM) theory, a mental state is conscious when, and only when, there is another mental state which represents it. The experience of the purple ball is conscious because x has another mental state, whose content is that x is having an experience of a purple ball. The two approaches are similar in that they construe consciousness in terms of self-awareness: in both theories, a mental state M being conscious depends on M being represented. They differ, however, in that while Brentano requires that M be represented by itself, the HOM theory allows, Synthese 134: 477–504, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.