Mechanism Design with Common Values
ثبت نشده
چکیده
vi = θ1 + θ2 Assume for simplicity that the θi are i.i.d. random variables with a continuous density on [0, 1]. How would you bid in a first price auction? How would you bid in a second price auction? Does the second price auction have dominant strategy equilibria? Does the game have other equilibria that are similar to dominant strategy equilibria in some sense? Analysis of the first price auction: Find a symmetric equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies. Implication: Player i wins if θi > θj. Given the continuous distribution, ties can be ignored. Therefore the expected payoff to player i with type θi from bidding b(θ ′ i) is: U(θi, θ ′ i) = (θi + E[θj | θi > θj]− b(θi))F (θi).
منابع مشابه
A Design Methodology for Reliable MRF-Based Logic Gates
Probabilistic-based methods have been used for designing noise tolerant circuits recently. In these methods, however, there is not any reliability mechanism that is essential for nanometer digital VLSI circuits. In this paper, we propose a novel method for designing reliable probabilistic-based logic gates. The advantage of the proposed method in comparison with previous probabilistic-based met...
متن کاملDesign and Analysis of a Novel Tendon-less Backbone Robot
A new type of backbone robot is presented in this paper. The core idea is to use a cross shape mechanism with the principle of functioning of the scissors linkages, known as a pantograph. Although this continuum arm acts quite similar to tendon-driven robot, this manipulator does not include any tendon in its structure. This design does not suffer from the weaknesses of the continuum design suc...
متن کاملOPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN IN A COMMON VALUE MODEL By
We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the revenue maximizing mechanism, each bidder makes a payment that is independent of his signal and the allocation discriminates in favor of bidders with lower signals. We provide a necessary and su cient condition under which the optimal mechanism reduces to a posted price under ...
متن کاملIncentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers
This paper proposes a new motivation for information sharing in a decentralized channel consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides a common product to the retailers at the same wholesale price. Both retailers add their own values to the product and distribute it to consumers. Factors such as retail prices, values added to the product, and local ad...
متن کاملOverview of Bergemann-Morris papers on Robust Mechanism Design
Since 1999, Dirk Bergemann and I have written a series of papers on "Robust Mechanism Design": 1. "Robust Mechanism Design." (Bergemann and Morris (2005)) 2. "Ex Post Implementation." (Bergemann and Morris (2008a)) 3. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms." (Bergemann and Morris (2009a)) 4. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values." (Bergemann and Morris (2007)) 5. "The Role of the...
متن کاملDesign and Dynamic Modeling of Planar Parallel Micro-Positioning Platform Mechanism with Flexible Links Based on Euler Bernoulli Beam Theory
This paper presents the dynamic modeling and design of micro motion compliant parallel mechanism with flexible intermediate links and rigid moving platform. Modeling of mechanism is described with closed kinematic loops and the dynamic equations are derived using Lagrange multipliers and Kane’s methods. Euler-Bernoulli beam theory is considered for modeling the intermediate flexible link. Based...
متن کامل