Filed Tariff Doctrine Allows Sprint's Unilateral Amendment to Fridays Free Agreements
نویسنده
چکیده
Introduction Suzanne Cahnmann's class action against Sprint Corporation appeared to be a relatively straightforward consumer claim, brought in Illinois state court, for breach of contract, fraud and injunctive relief. The complaint, after all, followed Sprint's enactment of unilateral changes to contracts entered into with long-distance customers; changes which drastically reduced promised savings on calls. reinforcing long-distance telephone carriers' right to unilaterally amend any offered calling rates. Though the court explicitly placed the burden on the consumer to ensure the rates offered are true prior to entering into any contract, long distance carriers are still left with the power to unilaterally amend any rates, at any time they desire.' In short, no matter how much investigating the customer does on a carrier's filed rate prior to contracting for service, all agreements are subject to unilateral changes by the carriers. As a result of this filed tariff doctrine, the court refused to grant injunctive relief from Sprint's deceptive advertising practices. This Note addresses the reasonings employed by the district and appellate courts that led to their rulings in favor of Sprint. Part I explains the factual background of the case leading to this litigation, and the arguments presented to the district court. Part II first reviews the ruling of the district court, which established Sprint's power to unilaterally amend tariffs filed with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). Part II then also discusses the Seventh Circuit's rationale in affirming the district court's holding. Part III analyzes the split among the federal circuit courts of appeals with regard to the question of federal jurisdiction over federally-regulated common carriers and whether the states possess the power to enjoin carriers from fraudulent and deceptive marketing practices. Part IV reviews the impact resulting from the Seventh Circuit's affirmation of the district court's holding in favor of Sprint, and the adverse effect this ruling has on consumers. Part V concludes, however, that until the issues surrounding the Loyola Consumer Law Review 0 317 1998 filed tariff doctrine are resolved by the United States Supreme Court, customers are left powerless to enforce terms embodied in agreements entered into with long distance carriers.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016