Why do popular mechanisms lack e¢ ciency in random assignment problems?
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior e¢ ciency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priroity. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gales celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with the exception of the present context) thanks to their outstanding e¢ ciency features. We present an equivalence result between the three kinds of mechanisms, that helps better understand why e¢ ciency di¤erences among popular mechanisms might arise in random assignment problems. JEL Classi cation: C71; C78; D71; D78
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Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
We consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior e¢ ciency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priority. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gales celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with th...
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