A new proof of existence of equilibria in infinite normal form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with compact sets of strategies and continuous payoffs by constructing Nash mappings. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games
Infinite normal form games that are mathematically simple have been treated [ Harris, C.J., Stinchcombe, M.B., Zame, W.R., in press. Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. Games Econ. Behav.]. Under study in this paper are the other infinite normal form games, a class that includes the normal forms of most extensive form games with infinite...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Appl. Math. Lett.
دوره 24 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011