Three Essays on Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Auction Setting and Collusive Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 Formulation of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.1 Optimality Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.2 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2.1 Budget Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2.2 Incentive Compatibility for Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.2.3 Participation Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.3 Optimization Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3 Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.1 Characterization of the Bid Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.2 Unconstrained Optimal Ring Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.3.3 Constrained Optimal Ring Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.0 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS . . . 17 3.
منابع مشابه
Three Essays in Economics and Finance By
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is joint work with Dan Bernhardt. We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly, and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first suppose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal to the asset’s stand-alone value to the seller....
متن کاملThree Essays on Auctions and Innovation
Innovation is central to development and economic growth. Innovation happens within some institutional framework. Auctions and auction-like mechanisms are institutions that organize transactions between economic agents. In the face of private information, they provide a means of revealing part of that information by inducing competition between agents. If well designed, they make use of the rev...
متن کاملEssays in Behavioral Economics: Applying Prospect Theory to Auctions
Title of Dissertation: ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: APPLYING PROSPECT THEORY TO AUCTIONS Anmol Ratan, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Directed By: Prof. Andreas Lange Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics I explore the implications of reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions. In the first part, I develop a Prospect theory based model to explain bidding in first-price auc...
متن کاملAutomobile Regulations in China Examined from a Behavioral Perspective
Automobile growth has created severe problems such as traffic congestion, air pollution, and carbon emission worldwide. To address these problems, Chinese local governments implemented a series of automobile regulations to slow down auto growth. They set up a yearly quota of license plates and require potential car buyers to obtain a license plate before buying an automobile. Local governments ...
متن کامل