Three Essays on Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Zhiyong Tu
  • Andreas Blume
  • Jack Ochs
  • Qinying He
چکیده

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Auction Setting and Collusive Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 Formulation of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.1 Optimality Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.2 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2.1 Budget Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2.2 Incentive Compatibility for Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.2.3 Participation Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.3 Optimization Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3 Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.1 Characterization of the Bid Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.2 Unconstrained Optimal Ring Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.3.3 Constrained Optimal Ring Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.0 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS . . . 17 3.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005