The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory

An account of well-being that Parfit labels the ‘desire-fulfillment’ theory ~1984, 493! has gained a great deal of support as the most plausible account of what makes a subject well-off. According to the desire-fulfillment, or DF, theory, an agent’s well-being is constituted by the obtaining of states of affairs that are desired by that agent. Importantly, though, while all DF theorists affirm that an account of what makes an agent well-off must ultimately refer to desire, there now appears to be a consensus among those defending DF theories that it is not the satisfaction of the agent’s actual desires that constitutes the agent’s wellbeing, but rather the satisfaction of those desires that the agent would have in what I will call a ‘hypothetical desire situation.’ Just as Rawls holds ~1971, 12! that the principles of right are those that would be unanimously chosen in a hypothetical choice situation, that is, a setting optimal for choosing such principles, defenders of DF theory hold that an agent’s good is what he or she would desire in a hypothetical desire situation, that is, a setting optimal for desiring. While the precise nature of the hypothetical desire situation is a matter of debate among DF theorists, all of them seem to agree that any adequate DF theory will incorporate a strong information condition into the hypothetical desire situation. In treating of the concept of an individual’s good, Sidgwick writes: