Naive Bayesian Learning and Adjustment to Equilibrium in Signaling Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper uses laboratory and simulation techniques to examine behavior in two signaling games with different payoff structures. Each game has two sequential equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is ruled out by standard “refinements.” The behavior of human subjects approaches the more refined equilibrium in one of the games, but it approaches the less refined equilibrium in the other game. This difference in subjects’ decisions is predicted by a simple Bayesian learning process. The period-by-period pattern of adjustment is tracked by computer simulations that incorporate Bayesian learning, logistic decision errors, and some strategic anticipation. Journal of Economic Literature classification: C72, C92 keywords: experiments, game theory, learning, simulations
منابع مشابه
A Validation Test Naive Bayesian Classification Algorithm and Probit Regression as Prediction Models for Managerial Overconfidence in Iran's Capital Market
Corporate directors are influenced by overconfidence, which is one of the personality traits of individuals; it may take irrational decisions that will have a significant impact on the company's performance in the long run. The purpose of this paper is to validate and compare the Naive Bayesian Classification algorithm and probit regression in the prediction of Management's overconfident at pre...
متن کاملPre-Bayesian Games
Work on modelling uncertainty in game theory and economics almost always uses Bayesian assumptions. On the other hand, work in computer science frequently uses non-Bayesian assumptions and appeal to forms of worst case analysis. In this talk we deal with Pre-Bayesian games, games with incomplete information but with no probabilistic assumptions about the environment. We first discuss safety-lev...
متن کاملRobust Opponent Modeling in Real-Time Strategy Games using Bayesian Networks
Opponent modeling is a key challenge in Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games as the environment is adversarial in these games, and the player cannot predict the future actions of her opponent. Additionally, the environment is partially observable due to the fog of war. In this paper, we propose an opponent model which is robust to the observation noise existing due to the fog of war. In order to cope...
متن کاملThe Effect of Play Therapy on Psychological Adjustment, Effective Communication with Others and Individual Abilities of Preschool Children
Background & Aims: One of the most important skills in preschool is social skills. In other words, social skills are concerned with empathy, self-efficacy, responsibility and social interaction, psychological adjustment, effective communication with others, and individual abilities. It is very important to learn social skills in childhood. By strengthening social skills in this period, we can s...
متن کاملSignaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion
A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver’s preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structu...
متن کامل